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1 Introduction
The relationship between economic uncertainty and investment is one of the central
issues in modern capital budgeting. The literature on real options emphasizes various
forms of managerial ﬂexibility in this context (see, e.g., Triantis and Hodder (1990)
and Trigeorgis (1996)).1 On the basis of that literature, we are used to thinking that
the value of ﬂexibility is positively related with the level of uncertainty.
In this paper we consider a particular form of ﬂexibility and provide a result that
calls for a reﬁnement of this view. We analyze a continuous-time model of investment
that follows closely the standard real-options framework. As in McDonald and Siegel
(1986), a ﬁrm can choose the optimal time to invest in an irreversible project whose
present value depends on the stochastic market environment. The diﬀerence with
the standard model is that, besides the possibility of undertaking the whole project
at a single, freely chosen point in time, the ﬁrm can also proceed to the same ﬁnal
state through incremental steps. We assume that there are scale economies that give
rise to the following trade-oﬀ: completing the investment in one lump saves on total
costs, while proceeding stepwise gives additional ﬂexibility as the ﬁrm can respond to
resolving uncertainty by choosing the investment timing individually for each step.
Concerning the eﬀect of uncertainty on this trade-oﬀ, the basic real-options intuition
seems to suggest that uncertainty favors ﬂexibility at the expense of scale economies.2
Yet our main result is the opposite: the higher the level of uncertainty, the more attrac-
tive the lumpy investment strategy relative to the stepwise investment. In this context,
therefore, the payoﬀ of the project being uncertain actually favors scale economies at
the expense of ﬂexibility.
[Insert Figure 1 about here]
To understand this seemingly paradoxical result, it is necessary to look beyond a
superﬁcial real-options intuition and to carefully consider what is meant by ﬂexibility
1For example, the notion of a positive value of ﬂexibility in an uncertain environment is presented in
Chapter 1 of Trigeorgis (1996): “As new information arrives and uncertainty about market conditions
and future cash ﬂows is gradually resolved, management may have valuable ﬂexibility to alter its
initial operating strategy in order to capitalize on favorable opportunities.”
2Dixit and Pindyck (1994) devote section 2.5 of their book to this issue and indicate that it
is uncertainty that makes ﬂexibility relevant in the ﬁrst place: “When the growth of demand is
uncertain, there is a trade-oﬀ between scale economies and the ﬂexibility that is gained by investing
more frequently in small increments to capacity as they are needed”.
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in diﬀerent contexts. The classical result is that the level of uncertainty is positively
related to the value of an option to undertake an irreversible investment. One may
express this by saying that the option to invest is a ﬂexible asset, and the value of this
ﬂexibility increases with uncertainty (option to invest has a positive vega3). In this
statement, ﬂexibility refers to the presence of an option to choose the investment timing
freely as opposed to a commitment to undertake a particular course of action at a given
moment. Similarly, consider the choice between two investment strategies illustrated
in Figure 1 (Panel A): either invest in the whole project now (lumpy investment) or
complete a fraction of the project now and keep an option to ﬁnish the remaining
fraction later (a ﬂexible alternative). Again, higher uncertainty increases the relative
value of ﬂexibility via its impact on the value of the second-stage option. However, this
comparison rests crucially upon the fact that the lumpy investment faces a restriction
on its timing (the implicit now-or-never assumption) and, by construction, cannot
beneﬁt from a higher payoﬀ volatility.
In contrast, the model presented in this paper allows for an optimal timing decision
for both steps of the ﬂexible project without placing any constraints on the timing
of the lumpy project either, as illustrated in Figure 1 (Panel B). So, in this paper
ﬂexibility refers to the possibility to choose the timing of each step individually as
opposed to the more restrictive case where a single timing decision must apply for the
entire project. This diﬀers from a ”standard” notion of ﬂexibility that refers to the
possibility to choose the timing for a project (or a part of a project) freely as opposed
to the commitment to invest immediately.
Why is it then that the value of ﬂexibility reduces with uncertainty in our setting?
We suggest two intuitions. The ﬁrst one follows from the theory of option pricing. Both
investment opportunities, the lumpy and the stepwise one, can be viewed as perpetual
American options to acquire the same underlying asset (the ﬁnal full-scale project).
When uncertainty increases, the values of both options converge towards the value of
the underlying asset. Consequently, the advantage of being able to choose the timing of
each stage separately instead of choosing the timing for both stages jointly diminishes
with uncertainty.
The second intuition builds on the well known insight of real-options theory accord-
ing to which increased uncertainty results in more inertia, that is, a decision maker is
more reluctant to make costly switches between states as a response to changes in the
3Recall that an option vega is the ﬁrst-order derivative of the option value with respect to the
volatility of the underlying asset and is positive in a typical case.
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underlying stochastic variable (cf. the hysteresis eﬀect in the entry-exit model of Dixit
(1989)). Our problem can be viewed as a special kind of a capacity switching problem.
Stepwise investment strategy contains two switches: the ﬁrst switch increases capacity
from zero level to intermediate level, and a later switch from intermediate to the ﬁnal
level. Lumpy investment strategy, on the other hand, skips the intermediate level, and
instead switches directly to the full capacity mode, albeit after a longer waiting time.
As uncertainty is increased, the ﬁrm is less willing to incur switching costs, which favors
the lumpy investment strategy.
While our model is stylized, the result relates to many potential applications. As
an example, think of a ﬁrm that considers entry into a new market segment and
faces the choice between two alternative strategies: either proceed in multiple stages
(for example, starting with the most proﬁtable geographical market), or wait until
demand has grown enough to justify a single large-scale entry. A related example is
the construction of production capacity: the choice may be between installing one big
unit and installing a number of smaller units. Or, consider the adoption of a new
technology: a ﬁrm can either start with an investment in an intermediate technology,
which allows a subsequent implementation of the next-generation technology at a lower
cost, or the ﬁrm may save on total costs by waiting and later ”leap-frogging” directly
to the next-generation technology. Our results indicate that, depending on the context,
increased uncertainty favors large-scale entry, large production plants, and technology
leapfrogging4. Note also that instead of referring to one project to be undertaken in
one or two steps, our framework may just as well be interpreted as two distinct projects
either carried out separately or pooled together at a discounted total cost. A similar
trade-oﬀ also appears in the purchase decision of a consumer, who may buy diﬀerent
goods separately each at its individually optimal time, or purchase them together
at a discounted price. With that interpretation, our results indicate that increased
uncertainty favors bundling of projects and purchases.
Our model is closely related to a number of earlier papers. It has been recognized
elsewhere that the degree of uncertainty inﬂuences the ﬁrm’s choice between alterna-
4In a similar context, Grenadier and Weiss (1997) provide a result that resembles ours. They show
in a model with sequential technological innovations that increased uncertainty favors waiting until the
ﬁnal technology is invented. The diﬀerence is that in their model uncertainty concerns the arrival time
of an improved technology, whereas in our model it concerns the market environment. Consequently,
in their model the improved technology is adopted at an exogenously determined moment, while in
our model the timing is endogenously determined. It should also be noted that Grenadier and Weiss
derive their result by numerical simulations, while our results are derived analytically.
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tive investment strategies. Dixit (1993) analyzes the choice between mutually exclusive
projects of diﬀerent sizes, and shows that increased uncertainty favors a larger project.
Related results on the relationship between uncertainty and sizes of investment projects
appear already in Manne (1961), and later in Capozza and Li (1994), Bar-Ilan and
Strange (1999) and Dangl (1999). De´camps et al. (2006), on the other hand, complete
the analysis of Dixit (1993) by considering the state-contingent investment policy over
the entire state space. Their main ﬁnding is that the interaction between mutually ex-
clusive options gives rise to a dichotomous option exercise region (a property that holds
also in our model). While their research question is thus entirely diﬀerent, the model
they use is technically related to ours.5 Another literature stream analyzes investment
strategies in a R&D context (see, e.g., Childs et al. (1998), Weitzman et al. (1981),
Roberts and Weitzman (1981)). That literature, like our paper, highlights the value
of stepwise investment strategies, but its focus is on an entirely diﬀerent mechanism
than ours. In that context the main advantage of stepwise investment is the additional
information that completing a step generates for choosing subsequent actions. In our
model there is no learning; the advantage is generated by the improved ﬂexibility to
choose investment timings as a response to an exogenously changing environment.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes the model,
while Section 3 derives the optimal investment policy. Section 4 explains how the policy
is aﬀected by the key model parameters, Section 5 discusses some generalizations, and
Section 6 concludes. All proofs are relegated to the Appendix.
2 Model
Our framework is based on the standard model of irreversible investment under un-
certainty as presented in McDonald and Siegel (1986), and further analyzed in a large
number of contributions (an extensive overview of this literature is provided in Dixit
and Pindyck (1994) as well as in Brennan and Trigeorgis (2000)).
Consider a risk-neutral, all-equity ﬁnanced ﬁrm, which operates in continuous time
with an inﬁnite horizon and discounts its cash ﬂows with a constant rate r.6 The ﬁrm
5The diﬀerence is that in their model two projects of diﬀerent scale are mutually exclusive: the
stepwise investment strategy requires full replacement of the small plant by the large plant. Our model
allows one to proceed to the ﬁnal ”large” project either through one lump or through incremental
steps with an arbitrary relationship between investment costs of various alternatives.
6Alternatively, we could assume that the payout from the project can be replicated by a (portfolio
of) traded asset(s).
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earns initially no revenue, but has an opportunity to invest in a single capital budgeting
project. This project can be accomplished either in one stage (which is referred to as
lumpy investment) or in two separate stages (stepwise investment). The timing of the
project and the type of investment (lumpy vs. stepwise) is to be chosen optimally in
order to maximize the value of the ﬁrm.
Denote by t ∈ [0,∞) the time index. The uncertain payoﬀ of the project is charac-
terized by state variable Yt that follows a geometric Brownian motion:
dYt = μYtdt + σYtdωt, (1)
where Y0 > 0, μ < r, σ > 0, and the dω’s are independently and identically distributed
according to a normal distribution with mean zero and variance dt.
We assume that the initial value Y0 is so low that at time t = 0 it is not yet optimal
for the ﬁrm to undertake the project (in neither lumpy nor stepwise fashion). This
will allow us to make our comparisons between various investment strategies simply
on the basis of their respective value functions calculated at Y0. We think that the
assumption of a low initial value for Y is very natural in the current context: to analyze
how uncertainty aﬀects the choice between various investment strategies, we want to
model the conditions under which the investment becomes optimal for the ﬁrst time. If
the initial value were higher than that, there should be some reason for why the project
has not yet been implemented before the ”initial” time. We recognize, however, that
analyzing the whole investment policy valid for arbitrary initial states would bring in
additional aspects (see De´camps et al. (2006)).
The ﬁrm’s cash ﬂows are modeled as follows. Initially, the ﬁrm earns no revenues.
Once k ∈ {1, 2} stages of the project are completed, the ﬁrm earns an instantaneous
proﬁt ﬂow:7
πt = Yt
k∑
i=1
Ri, (2)
where Ri is a constant denoting the deterministic part of the proﬁt increment corre-
sponding to stage i. Deﬁne R ≡ R1+R2. By accomplishing the project in a single step,
the ﬁrm moves at some stopping time tL directly from proﬁt ﬂow 0 to YtLR (lumpy
investment), while by splitting the project, the ﬁrm moves ﬁrst at some stopping time
t1 from 0 to Yt1R1, and at a later stopping time t
2 from Yt2R1 to Yt2R (stepwise in-
vestment). The cost of investment depends on whether the project is accomplished
7Since neither depreciation, nor operating costs are modeled, the terms cash flow, profit, and
revenue are used interchangeably.
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in one or two steps. In case of lumpy investment, the total investment cost is simply
I. In case of stepwise investment, the associated investment costs for the ﬁrst and
second steps are I1(< I) and I2, respectively. The ﬁrm’s optimal strategy can thus be
characterized as the following maximization problem:8
F (Y0) = max {FL (Y0) ;FS (Y0)} = max
⎧⎨⎩suptL≥0E
⎛⎝ ∞∫
tL
e−rtYtRdt− e−rtLI
⎞⎠ ; (3)
sup
t1≥0
E
⎛⎝ sup
t2≥t1
E
⎛⎝ t2∫
t1
e−rtYtR1dt− e−rt1I1 +
∞∫
t2
e−rtYtRdt− e−rt2I2
⎞⎠⎞⎠⎫⎬⎭ ,
where tL, t1, and t2 are stopping times adapted to Yt. The ﬁrst term in the brackets,
FL (Y0), is the expectation of the discounted future cash ﬂows if the lumpy investment is
chosen. Here, the ﬁrm chooses the stopping time tL at which the project is undertaken.
The second term, FS (Y0), corresponds to the stepwise investment. Then, the ﬁrm
chooses two stopping times, t1 and t2, corresponding to stages 1 and 2 of the project,
respectively. Whether the ﬁrm chooses the lumpy or the stepwise alternative depends
on which of the two terms is greater.
We adopt the following assumptions on the investment costs and revenues. First,
we assume that completing the project in two steps is more costly than investing in
one lump and deﬁne
κ ≡ (I1 + I2) /I ≥ 1. (4)
Consequently, κ represents the premium for ﬂexibility that the ﬁrm must pay in order
to be able to split the project. Second, without loss of generality, we assume that
I1
I2
<
R1
R2
. (5)
As it becomes clear later, this implies that even if we interpret the model so that the
ﬁrm is free to choose the order in which the two steps are undertaken, the step that
will be optimally completed ﬁrst is the one labelled with subscript 1. We only assume
away the trivial case R1
R2
= I1
I2
, which would imply that it is always optimal to undertake
the two steps at the same point of time. In that case the ﬁrm does not beneﬁt from
the possibility to split the project, and the lumpy project with no cost premium would
8This expression is suﬃcient for deﬁning the optimization problem because Y0 is so low that it is
not optimal to invest at t = 0.
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always dominate.9
To facilitate the communication of our results, we divide the parameters of the
model into two classes. First, parameters μ, σ, and r describe the economic envi-
ronment in which the ﬁrm operates, and we call them the market-speciﬁc parameters.
Second, the parameters R1, R2, I1, I2, and I describe the project under consideration,
and we call them the project-speciﬁc parameters. Our purpose is to show how changes
in market-speciﬁc parameters aﬀect the regions in the space of project speciﬁc param-
eters in which each of the two alternative investment strategies (lumpy vs. stepwise)
dominates. This approach will provide an unambiguous answer to our main question,
that is, how the degree of uncertainty aﬀects the optimal choice between the stepwise
and lumpy investment and, hence, the relative value of ﬂexibility.
3 Optimal Investment Policy
In this section, we derive the optimal solution to the project selection problem (3) in
three steps. First, we consider the case where only the lumpy investment alternative is
available. Second, we derive the optimal investment policy for the stepwise investment
case. Finally, we consider the general problem where the ﬁrm has to decide about both
the timing and the type of investment.
3.1 Lumpy investment
Consider the case in which the project can be undertaken in a single step only. Then
the value of the investment opportunity is the ﬁrst term between the brackets in (3),
that is, the problem is to choose tL optimally to yield the value FL (Y0):
FL (Y0) = sup
tL≥0
E
⎛⎝ ∞∫
tL
e−rtYtRdt− e−rtLI
⎞⎠ .
This case corresponds exactly to the basic model of investment under uncertainty as
described in McDonald and Siegel (1986). The optimal investment policy is a trigger
strategy such that it is optimal to invest whenever the current value of Y is above a
certain threshold level, which we denote by YL. Thus, the optimal investment time is
tL = inf {t ≥ 0 |Yt ≥ YL}. The standard procedure to solve the problem is to set up the
9The latter conclusion would also hold if the ﬁrm were not able to ﬁrst invest in the more proﬁtable
stage of project due to, for example, technological constraints.
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dynamic programming equation for the value function FL (Y0), where the application
of Itoˆ’s lemma and appropriate boundary conditions are used to determine the exact
form of FL (Y0) and the value of YL. We merely state the result here, see e.g. Dixit
and Pindyck (1994) for details. The investment threshold is
YL =
β
β − 1
I
R
(r − μ) , (6)
where
β =
1
2
− μ
σ2
+
√(
1
2
− μ
σ2
)2
+
2r
σ2
> 1, (7)
and the value of the option to invest is
FL (Y0) =
(
YLR
r − μ − I
)(
Y0
YL
)β
. (8)
Expression (8) is valid when initial demand is so low that it is not optimal to invest
right away, that is when Y0 < YL.
3.2 Stepwise investment
Now, consider the case in which the ﬁrm splits the project into two stages. Then the
value of the investment opportunity is the second term between the brackets in (3),
that is, the problem is to choose t1 and t2 optimally to yield the value FS (Y0):
FS (Y0) = sup
t1≥0
E
⎛⎝ sup
t2≥t1
E
⎛⎝ t2∫
t1
e−rtR1dt− e−rt1I1 +
∞∫
t2
e−rtRdt− e−rt2I2
⎞⎠⎞⎠ . (9)
The option to invest in the ﬁrst stage may be seen as a compound option, since ac-
complishing it generates an option to proceed to the next stage.10 However, since the
instantaneous proﬁt (2) is additive in the proﬁt ﬂows associated with each stage, the
problem can be represented as two separate investment problems. This can be seen by
re-writing (9) as
FS (Y0) = sup
t1≥0
E
⎛⎝ ∞∫
t1
e−rtR1dt− e−rt1I1
⎞⎠+ sup
t2≥t1
E
⎛⎝ ∞∫
t2
e−rtR2dt− e−rt2I2
⎞⎠ . (10)
10See Bar-Ilan and Strange (1998) for a more complex model of sequential investment that incor-
porates investment lags.
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Expression (10) implies that the problem is decomposed into two stopping problems,
which are only linked through the constraint t2 ≥ t1. For the moment, ignore this
constraint, and note that each of the two resulting problems is identical to the one
considered in Section 3.1. Therefore, without constraint t2 ≥ t1, the solution must
consist of two investment thresholds, Y1 and Y2, given by
Y1 =
β
β − 1
I1
R1
(r − μ) , (11)
Y2 =
β
β − 1
I2
R2
(r − μ) . (12)
Comparing these expressions, one can see immediately that Y1 < Y2 under our
assumption that R1
R2
> I1
I2
. Therefore, concerning the corresponding stopping times
ti = inf {t ≥ 0 |Yt ≥ Yi} , i ∈ {1, 2}, it must hold that t2 > t1, which means that
the constraint t2 ≥ t1 is automatically satisﬁed. We conclude that the ﬁrst stage is
accomplished strictly earlier than the second stage, and that the existence of stage 2
has no eﬀect on the optimal exercise time of stage 1, meaning that the two stages can
be considered separately.11 We denote the values of the options to invest separately
for the two stages as F1 (Y0) and F2 (Y0). Analogously to (8), these can be written as
F1 (Y ) =
(
Y1R1
r − μ − I1
)(
Y0
Y1
)β
, (13)
F2 (Y ) =
(
Y2R2
r − μ − I2
)(
Y0
Y2
)β
, (14)
and they are applicable for Y0 < Y1 and Y0 < Y2, respectively. The value of the
(compound) option to invest sequentially can be written as:
FS (Y0) = F1 (Y0) + F2 (Y0) =
(
Y1R1
r − μ − I1
)(
Y0
Y1
)β
+
(
Y2R2
r − μ − I2
)(
Y0
Y2
)β
, (15)
which is again valid as long as Y0 is low enough, in particular, when Y0 < Y1.
3.3 General problem
So far, we have determined the option values and the optimal investment thresholds
for the two investment strategies (lumpy and stepwise) separately. Now we consider
11This result is due to the special structure of optimal stopping problems that also underlies the
main conclusions of Leahy (1993) and Baldursson and Karatzas (1997), according to which an investor,
who must take into account subsequent investments of the competitors, employs the same investment
policy as a monopolist who is not threatened by such future events.
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the general problem (3). Since we have assumed that the initial value Y0 is so low
that it is not optimal to undertake the project (in any mode) at t = 0, the value of
the ﬁrm is simply F (Y0) = max {FL (Y0) ;FS (Y0)}, where the expressions for FL (Y0)
and FS (Y0) are given by (8) and (15), respectively. Our aim is to establish conditions
that determine which of these expressions is greater. Since we are interested in the
trade-oﬀ between the economies of scale and ﬂexibility, we want to state the relation
of the option values in terms of the parameter κ that represents the cost premium that
must be paid by the ﬁrm for the ﬂexibility of splitting the investment.
The following proposition states that there is a single cut-oﬀ value such that if κ
is below that level, the option value corresponding to the stepwise investment strategy
dominates that of lumpy investment, while the reverse is true for κ above that level.12
Note that a similar interpretation of the domination relation of mutually exclusive
options is implicitly adopted, for example, in Dixit (1993).
Proposition 1 Let Y0 < Y1. There exists a critical level of the investment cost pre-
mium κ̂ > 1 such that when κ = κ̂, we have FS (Y0) = FL (Y0), that is, the lumpy
and stepwise investment strategies are equally good. The critical premium κ̂ can be
expressed as follows:
κ̂ =
[
γΠβ−11 + (1− γ) Πβ−12
] 1
β−1
, (16)
where
γ ≡ R1
R
(17)
is the fraction of the payoﬀ of the project generated after completing stage 1, and
Πi ≡ Ri/Ii
R/ (I1 + I2)
(18)
is the relative proﬁtability of (moneyness of the option associated with) stage i. For
κ < κ̂, we have FS (Y0) > FL (Y0), whereas for κ > κ̂, we have FL (Y0) > FS (Y0).
Proof. See the Appendix.
Proposition 1 gives us an unambiguous dominance relation between the lumpy and
stepwise investment. Note that κ̂ depends on the market-speciﬁc parameters μ, σ,
and r through their eﬀect on parameter β only. Hence, β aggregates the eﬀect of the
12More generally, we could present the threshold where the two options are equally valuable as the
surface in the space of all model parameters, where function f (r, κ, μ, σ, I1, I2, R1, R2;Y ) ≡ FS (Y )−
FL (Y ) equals zero for low values of Y . Thus, the threshold level κ̂ is implicitly deﬁned by the condition
f (r, κ̂, μ, σ, I1, I2, R1, R2;Y ) = 0, and is thus of course a function of all other parameters of the model.
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environment in which the ﬁrm operates on the choice between the lumpy and stepwise
investment strategies.
The inﬂuence of the project-speciﬁc factors is captured by three parameters: the
fraction of the total payoﬀ from the project that can be attributed to the stage 1
investment, γ, and the proﬁtability of each stage relative to the proﬁtability of the
project as a whole, Πi. This proﬁtability can also be directly interpreted as the relative
moneyness of the option to invest in stage i.
4 Eﬀect of Uncertainty
Our main objective is to show how the choice between lumpy and stepwise investment
strategies depends on market-speciﬁc parameters. An increase in κ̂ is equivalent to a
reduction (an expansion) of the set of project-speciﬁc parameter values under which the
lumpy investment dominates (is dominated by) the stepwise investment. This leads
to the interpretation that κ̂ represents the cost advantage of the lumpy investment
required to compensate for the loss of ﬂexibility in timing each step of the project
separately. Thus, an increase (a decrease) in κ̂ is equivalent to a higher (lower) relative
value of additional ﬂexibility associated with stepwise investment.
From (16), we see that β captures the eﬀects of all market-speciﬁc parameters. The
next proposition states our main result:
Proposition 2 Consider the critical cost premium κ̂ as a function of β. Then, the
following relationship holds:
∂κ̂
∂β
> 0.
This implies that the relative value of stepwise investment is negatively related to
the volatility and to the drift rate of process (1), but positively related to the interest
rate:
∂κ̂
∂σ
< 0, (19)
∂κ̂
∂μ
< 0, (20)
∂κ̂
∂r
> 0. (21)
Proof. See the Appendix.
Equation (19) embodies the main result of this paper: increased uncertainty reduces
the premium that the ﬁrm is willing to pay for the additional ﬂexibility that the stepwise
12
investment gives. The eﬀects of the drift rate and interest rate, as given by (20) and
(21) respectively, are less surprising, but they are nevertheless revealing. The intuition
for (20) is that if the rate at which the present value of the project grows is reduced (μ
is reduced), the cost of delaying investment until it is optimal to undertake both stages
together is increased, which makes the stepwise investment more attractive. This is
quite obvious, but it completes our main argument: it is rather the fact that the growth
is gradual (slow) that makes stepwise investment valuable in this context, not the fact
that growth is uncertain. Of course, the eﬀect of the interest rate, as expressed in
(21), can be explained in a similar way: discounting cash ﬂows more heavily makes it
more costly to delay investment until both stages are optimally undertaken together.
Therefore, the relative value of stepwise investment is higher.
To understand the main result given in (19), it is helpful to use the following
analogy. First, notice that (16) can be rearranged as:
κ̂β−1 = γΠβ−11 + (1− γ)Πβ−12 . (22)
The left-hand side reﬂects the premium on the investment cost when selecting the step-
wise investment, whereas the right-hand side is the beneﬁt from timing the investment
in each stage of the project optimally. The cutoﬀ level of the premium, κ̂, can be there-
fore interpreted as the certainty equivalent of random payout Πi, i ∈ {1, 2}, (occurring
with probability γ and 1− γ), when the utility function is of the form u(x) = xβ−1. It
is straightforward to see that the certainty equivalent decreases with the concavity of
the utility function. In the analyzed case, the latter is negatively related to β.
It is useful to think of our main result in yet another way. For κ = 1 and ﬁnite
σ, the value of the lumpy investment opportunity is always smaller than the value
of the option to invest in a stepwise fashion (cf. (8) and (15)). When uncertainty
tends to inﬁnity, the values of both investment opportunities converge to the value of
the underlying asset, that is, the present value of cash ﬂow generated in perpetuity
by the full-scale project. (In fact, it is easy to show that the limit of (8) and (15)
for σ tending to inﬁnity is equal to Y R/(r − μ).) Therefore, it is not surprising that
for higher uncertainty the willingness to pay a premium for the ability to invest in a
stepwise fashion is lower.
To shed more light on the behavior of κ̂ as a function of volatility, we calculate its
limits for σ →∞ and σ → 0. It holds that (see the Appendix for proofs)
lim
σ→∞
κ̂ = Πγ1Π
1−γ
2 , (23)
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and
lim
σ→0
κ̂ =
⎧⎪⎨⎪⎩
Π1 μ ≤ 0,[
γΠ
r−μ
μ
1 + (1− γ)Π
r−μ
μ
2
] μ
r−μ
μ > 0.
(24)
In an extremely uncertain market (σ →∞), the cutoﬀ level of the ﬂexibility premium
is equal to the geometric weighted average of the relative proﬁtabilities of the two
stages of the project. Conversely, for a deterministic demand process (σ → 0), two
cases are possible. If the drift rate μ of the demand process is non-positive, the cutoﬀ
level of the ﬂexibility premium is equal to the maximum of the relative proﬁtabilities
of stages 1 and 2 (which is Π1 by assumption (5)). For a strictly positive μ, κ̂ is given
by (16) where β admits its limiting value for σ → 0.13
To interpret the meaning of the deterministic limit of κ̂ for μ ≤ 0, consider two
cases – of a negative and of a zero NPV of the lumpy project. If the NPV of the
whole (lumpy) project is negative (that is, if Y R/(r − μ)− I < 0), then the ﬁrm will
be indiﬀerent between having the lumpy project and being able to invest sequentially
with a ﬂexibility premium equal to Π1. In both cases, no investment will be made and
the value of the ﬁrm is zero. In the special case of a zero NPV of the lumpy project,
stepwise investment strictly dominates the lumpy one as long as κ < κ̂ = Π1. Then,
the ﬁrst step of the stepwise investment yields a strictly positive NPV and the second
step is abandoned. The strictly positive sign of the ﬁrst step is concluded by observing
that
NPV1 =
Y R1
r − μ − I1 = γ
(
Y R
r − μ −
κ
Π1
I
)
.
Obviously, this is greater than zero as long as κ < Π1.
14
[Insert Figure 2 about here]
13Note that for μ = 0.5r, that is, when the expected return is equal to the return shortfall, κ̂ reduces
to the arithmetic weighted average of relative proﬁtabilities Πi.
14If the NPV of the lumpy project was positive (which would contradict our initial assumption
that Y0 is very low), two scenarios would be possible: of a negative and a positive NPV of stage 2
investment. In the latter situation, it holds that κ̂ = 0 as both stages would be optimally undertaken
immediately anyway. In the former case (that is, when the NPV of stage 2 is negative), the sequential
project will be strictly dominant for κ ∈ (1,Π1 − δ), where δ is a solution to
γ
(
Y R
r − μ −
Π1 − δ
Π1
I
)
=
Y R
r − μ − I.
14
Figure 2 provides a numerical illustration of the model. It depicts the relationship
between the cut-oﬀ level of the ﬂexibility premium, κ̂ and the volatility of the proﬁt
ﬂow, σ, with the following parameter values. The riskless interest rate is assumed
to be 5% (which is approximately equal to the average yield on long-term treasury
bonds based on the period 1926-99, as reported in Bodie et al. (2002)) and the drift
rate of the project is assumed to be equal to 1.5% (implying a 3.5% return shortfall,
which is approximately consistent with a long-term dividend yield as reported by Allen
and Michaely (2002)). The proportion of the total investment cost incurred in each
stage is one half (α = 0.5). Consistent with the results of our model, we can see
that the relationship between project ﬂexibility (measured by κ̂) and uncertainty (σ)
is negative. Assuming that I = $100, and that between three and four ﬁfths of the
revenue is generated following the completion of stage 1, the maximum amount that
the ﬁrm is willing to pay for ﬂexibility ranges between $6 and $46 in the case of no
uncertainty, and between $3 and $32 for σ = 0.2 (the latter corresponds to the standard
deviation of equity returns of a representative S&P 500 ﬁrm, see Bodie et al. (2002)).
5 Extensions
Admittedly, the model is very simple and it is not obvious to what extent our main
result is driven by the current speciﬁcation of the project’s payoﬀ. For example, one
might suspect that if, instead of a linear dependence like in our basic model, the
project value is concave in the stochastic payoﬀ Yt, then the sign of the relationship
between uncertainty and the value of ﬂexibility will be reversed. This could be the
case if the eﬀect of a higher upside potential associated with a higher payoﬀ volatility
was dominated by its decreasing marginal contribution to the present value of the
project. On the other hand, the notion of project ﬂexibility is often associated with
the possibility to revise investment decisions frequently (Trigeorgis (1996)), rather than
merely adding a second step to an indivisible investment project.
To deal with these issues, this section extends our result by considering a more
general, power speciﬁcation of the proﬁt function (Section 5.1) and by allowing for an
arbitrary number of steps for which the timing can be independently chosen (Section
5.2).
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5.1 Proﬁt ﬂow as a power function of the underlying variable
To account for a nonlinear impact of the market environment on the present value of
the project, we allow the proﬁt ﬂow to have a power speciﬁcation (cf. (2)):
πt =
(
Yt
n∑
i=1
Ri
)θ
, θ ∈ (0, β) . (25)
For θ < 1, the ﬁrm is facing a concave proﬁt function, which may reﬂect, for example,
constraints on input availability or, to some extent, imperfect hedging opportunities of
risk averse shareholders. The case of θ > 1 may arise because of the ﬁrm’s ability to
respond to uncertainty (for example, by changing both price and quantity in response
to demand ﬂuctuations).15 Condition θ < β is required for obtaining a ﬁnite present
value of the project cash ﬂow.
With the payoﬀ function (25), condition (5) is replaced by
I1
I2
<
Rθ1
Rθ − Rθ1
≡ R˜1
R˜2
, (26)
where we introduce the notation R˜1 + R˜2 ≡ R˜ = Rθ. This condition ensures that if
the ﬁrm chooses the sequential investment strategy, the stage labeled with subscript
1 is optimally undertaken strictly before stage 2. In the remainder of the section, we
assume that this condition is satisﬁed.
Before we proceed to analyzing the investment decision(s) of the ﬁrm, it is useful
to establish the following present value:
E
⎛⎝ ∞∫
t
e−rtY θt dt
⎞⎠ = Y θt
r − θμ− 1
2
θ (θ − 1)σ2 ≡
Y θt
δ(θ)
. (27)
Since for x > 0 condition δ(x) > 0 is equivalent to x < β (note that β, given by (7), is
the positive root of the quadratic equation in the denominator of (27)), the convergence
of the present value of the project cash ﬂow requires that θ < β. Obviously, for linear
and concave payoﬀ functions this condition is always satisﬁed.
15In particular, think of a monopolist facing an isoelastic inverse demand function pt = Ytq
−1/θ
t (pt is
price, qt is quantity). Assuming that the ﬁrm has constant marginal production cost ci, and no capacity
constraint, the proﬁt ﬂow with optimally chosen output level is given by πt = Y θc1−θi θ
−1 (1− 1θ)θ−1,
which is the same as (25) with an appropriately deﬁned correspondence between Ri and ci. In that
case, investment outlays should be interpreted as adoptions of diﬀerent technologies that allow diﬀerent
marginal production costs ci.
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Analogously to Section 3.1, we begin by analyzing the lumpy investment strategy.
The option value of the project can now be written as
FL (Y ) = sup
tL≥0
E
⎛⎝ ∞∫
tL
e−rtY θt R˜dt− Ie−rt
L
⎞⎠ . (28)
The resulting optimal investment threshold, YL, equals
16
YL =
1
R
(
β
β − θIδ(θ)
) 1
θ
. (29)
The value of the project can now be expressed as
FL (Y ) =
(
Y θL R˜
δ(θ)
− I
)(
Y
YL
)β
. (30)
For θ = 1, (30) reduces to (8).
Analogously to (15), the value of the option to invest sequentially is
FS (Y ) = F1 (Y ) + F2 (Y ) =
(
Y θ1 R˜1
δ(θ)
− I1
)(
Y
Y1
)β
+
(
Y θ2 R˜2
δ(θ)
− I2
)(
Y
Y2
)β
, (31)
where
Yi =
(
β
β − θ
Ii
R˜i
δ(θ)
) 1
θ
, (32)
for i ∈ {1, 2}. Now, we are able to derive the cut-oﬀ premium for ﬂexibility
κ̂ =
(
γ˜Π˜
β
θ
−1
1 + (1− γ˜)Π˜
β
θ
−1
2
) 1
β
θ
−1
, (33)
where γ˜ and Π˜i are deﬁned in an analogous way as in Proposition 1. As in the case
with a linear proﬁt function, it holds that (for proofs, see the Appendix)
∂κ̂
∂σ
< 0, ∀ θ < β. (34)
Inequality (34) indicates that our main result is not driven by the choice of a linear
payoﬀ function. In fact, for all levels of θ for which the value of the project is ﬁnite,
our main result is still valid.
Finally, it can be shown that
∂κ̂
∂θ
< 0, (35)
16Note that the required mark-up on the investment cost for the project to be undertaken is now
β/(β − θ), which increases with the payoﬀ convexity.
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which means that for a given level of uncertainty, the premium for project ﬂexibility
decreases with the convexity of the proﬁt function. This implies that a ﬁrm holding a
project with a more concave payoﬀ function will, in fact, be willing to incur a higher
additional costs to preserve ﬂexibility in the investment process.17 The intuition is
that concavity increases the value of the ﬁrst stage relative to the value of the whole
project. This eﬀect increases the value of the sequential strategy relative to the lumpy
investment, simply because the stepwise strategy makes it possible to undertake the
ﬁrst stage investment in isolation.
Finally, note that adopting the payoﬀ function (25) instead of (2) is in fact equiv-
alent to transforming the stochastic process from Y to Y θ (with the relabeling of the
parameters R1 and R2). Hence, another way to see that our result can be generalized
to the power function is to observe that Y θ follows a geometric Brownian motion with
diﬀerent drift and volatility terms than the original process Y . It is straightforward to
show that whenever β of the original process of Y as given by (7) increases (decreases),
then also the corresponding β ′ of the process Y θ increases (decreases), which means
that Proposition 2 holds also in this generalized model.18
5.2 An arbitrary number of steps
In order to incorporate the notion that project ﬂexibility is equivalent to the possibility
of revising investment decisions frequently (Trigeorgis (1996)), we now analyze optimal
capital budgeting strategy when the ﬁrm is able to split the project into n ≥ 2 stages.
Deﬁne Ri and Ii in an analogous way to that in previous sections. The instantaneous
proﬁt ﬂow has therefore the following form (cf. 25):
πt =
(
Yt
n∑
i=1
Ri
)θ
. (36)
Now, deﬁne
Sk ≡
k∑
i=0
Ri (37)
17This observation is consistent with (26), which implies that a more convex payoﬀ function favors
the lumpy investment strategy.
18Given that Y follows (1), the process Y θ follows a geometric Brownian motion with drift and
volatility terms μ′ = θμ + 12θ (θ − 1)σ2 and σ′ = θσ, respectively. Hence, we may write β′ =
1
2 − μ
′
σ′2 +
√(
1
2 − μ
′
σ′2
)2
+ 2rσ′2 =
β
θ .
18
for k > 0, with R0 ≡ 0. Analogously to (26), to ensure that an investor chooses to
accomplish stage k at a strictly earlier time than stage k + 1, we must have
Ik
Ik+1
<
Sθk − Sθk−1
Sθk+1 − Sθk
≡ R˜k
R˜k+1
, ∀ k < n. (38)
Now, it is possible to generalize the formula for the cut-oﬀ value of the ﬂexibility
premium:
κ̂ =
(
n∑
i=1
γ˜iΠ˜
β
θ
−1
i
) 1
β
θ
−1
, (39)
where γ˜i ≡ R˜i/R˜. The proof that κ̂ increases with β, thus decreases with σ is analogous
to the proof of Proposition 2 and of its extension in Section 5.1.
[Insert Figure 3 about here]
To provide an illustration, Figure 3 depicts the cut-oﬀ level of the ﬂexibility pre-
mium as a function of payoﬀ convexity θ for diﬀerent values of n. Consistent with (35),
the value of the project ﬂexibility decreases with payoﬀ convexity and is higher for a
larger number of stages. For I = $100, γi = 1.5γi+1 and αi = 1/n, the maximum level
of ﬂexibility premium ranges between $40 and $117 for a concave (θ = 0.5), $3 and $17
for a linear (θ = 1), and between less than $1 and $6 for a convex payoﬀ (θ = 1.25).
6 Conclusion
We analyze the optimal investment strategy of a ﬁrm that can either accomplish the
project in one lump or proceed in steps. The former strategy has the advantage of
scale economies: the total investment cost is lower. The latter beneﬁts from additional
ﬂexibility: the timing of each step can be chosen independently of each other. Our
focus is on the eﬀect of uncertainty on the trade-oﬀ between the two strategies. The
result is that increased uncertainty favors the lumpy investment relative to the stepwise
investment.
One way to express our main result is to say that increased uncertainty reduces the
value of ﬂexibility associated with stepwise investment. This is in contrast with the
standard real-options intuition, which says that increased uncertainty typically favors
ﬂexibility. Our key message is that such a statement – that is, uncertainty favors
managerial ﬂexibility – is not to be taken as a general fact. In particular, one must be
19
careful in specifying what is meant by ﬂexibility. If ﬂexibility refers to the presence of
an option to act later as opposed to the commitment to act now, then the standard
result certainly holds: the value of ﬂexibility increases with uncertainty. But if, as we
show in this paper, ﬂexibility refers to the possibility to split a project into a number
of steps and to choose the timing of each step individually, then we have the opposite
result: increased uncertainty reduces the value of ﬂexibility.
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A Appendix
Proof of Proposition 1. We begin by comparing the two option values FL (Y ) and
FS (Y ). It holds (cf. (8) and (15)) that
FS (Y )
FL (Y )
=
(
Y1R1
r−μ − I1
)(
Y
Y1
)β
+
(
Y2R2
r−μ − I2
)(
Y
Y2
)β
(
YLR
r−μ − I
)(
Y
YL
)β
= R−β
(
I1 + I2
κ
)β−1(
Rβ1
Iβ−11
+
Rβ2
Iβ−12
)
, (A.1)
since I1+I2 ≡ κI, and investment thresholds YL, Y1, and Y2, are given by (6), (11), and
(12), respectively. Equation (16) follows directly from (A.1). Since β is always greater
than 1, and all terms in (A.1) are positive, it holds that ∂
∂κ
(
FS(Y )
FL(Y )
)
< 0. This implies
that FS(Y )
FL(Y )
= 1 if and only if κ = κ̂ and that the inequalities stated in the proposition
hold.
Now, in order to prove that κ̂ > 1, we show that the FS (Y ) > FL (Y ) for κ = 1.
Recall that α and γ are deﬁned as
I1 ≡ αIκ, (A.2)
R1 ≡ γR. (A.3)
Of course, (A.2) and (A.3) imply that I2 = (1− α) Iκ and R2 = (1− γ)R.19 Deﬁne
D (β) ≡
(
γβ
αβ−1
+
(1− γ)β
(1− α)β−1
)
, (A.4)
which equals the ratio of FS (Y ) and FL (Y ) for κ = 1. It can easily be seen that lim
β→1
D (β) = 1. To show that D (β) > 1 for β > 1, we calculate the following derivative
∂D (β)
∂β
=
∂
∂β
(
γβ
αβ−1
+
(1− γ)β
(1− α)β−1
)
(A.5)
= γ
(γ
α
)β−1
ln
γ
α
+ (1− γ)
(
1− γ
1− α
)β−1
ln
1− γ
1− α.
For γ ↓ α, (A.5) is equal to zero. Therefore, in order to prove that (A.5) is positive, it
is suﬃcient to show that
∂
∂γ
[
γ
(γ
α
)β−1
ln
γ
α
+ (1− γ)
(
1− γ
1− α
)β−1
ln
1− γ
1− α
]
(A.6)
19In (A.2), we allow for an arbitrary κ.
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is positive. Diﬀerentiating (A.6) and rearranging yields(γ
α
)β−1
β ln
γ
α
−
(
1− γ
1− α
)β−1
β ln
1− γ
1− α +
(γ
α
)β−1
−
(
1− γ
1− α
)β−1
> 0.
The last inequality results from the fact that the ﬁrst three components are positive
and that γ
α
> 1 > 1−γ
1−α . Consequently, for κ = 1 and β > 1, the value of the sequential
investment opportunity is higher than the value of the lumpy project. Since (A.1)
decreases with κ, κ̂ is greater than 1.
Proof of Proposition 2. κ̂ can be expressed as
κ̂ =
(
γΠβ−11 + (1− γ) Πβ−12
) 1
β−1
. (A.7)
Let us choose two arbitrary values of β, say β ′ and β ′′, such that β ′ > β ′′, and deﬁne
δ ≡ β
′ − 1
β ′′ − 1 > 1.
It holds that
γΠβ
′′−1
1 + (1− γ) Πβ
′′−1
2 = γΠ
β′−1
δ
1 + (1− γ) Π
β′−1
δ
2
<
(
γΠβ
′−1
1 + (1− γ)Πβ
′−1
2
) 1
δ
,
where the last inequality results from the fact that y
1
δ is a concave function. This
implies the following inequality:(
γΠβ
′′−1
2 + (1− γ)Πβ
′′−1
2
)δ
< γΠβ
′−1
1 + (1− γ) Πβ
′−1
2 .
It follows immediately that(
γΠβ
′′−1
1 + (1− γ) Πβ
′′−1
2
) 1
β′′−1
<
(
γΠβ
′−1
1 + (1− γ) Πβ
′−1
2
) 1
β′−1
.
Deﬁning β ′ ≡ β ′′ + Δβ1 and letting Δβ tend to zero leads to the conclusion that
∂κ̂/∂β > 0. Results (19)-(21) follow from the fact that ∂β/∂σ < 0, ∂β/∂μ < 0, and
∂β/∂r > 0, respectively.
Proof of (23) and (24). First, we prove (23).
lim
σ→∞
κ̂ = lim
σ→∞
[
γΠβ−11 + (1− γ)Πβ−12
] 1
β−1
= exp
⎡⎣ lim
σ→∞
log
[
γΠβ−11 + (1− γ)Πβ−12
]
β − 1
⎤⎦
= exp
[
lim
σ→∞
γΠβ−11 logΠ1 + (1− γ) Πβ−12 log Π2
γΠβ−11 + (1− γ) Πβ−12
]
= eγ log Π1+(1−γ) logΠ2
= Πγ1Π
1−γ
2 .
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To prove (24), we ﬁrst use the known property that lim
σ→0
β equals inﬁnity for μ ≤ 0 and
r/μ otherwise (Dixit and Pindyck (1994)). Consequently, in the latter case the limit
of κ̂ equals (16) with β replaced by r/μ. In the case of negative drift rate μ, we use
the three-series theorem (recall that Π1 > Π2). It holds that
γΠβ−11 + (1− γ) Πβ−12 > γΠβ−11[
γΠβ−11 + (1− γ) Πβ−12
] 1
β−1
> γ
1
β−1Π1,
and
γΠβ−11 + (1− γ) Πβ−11 > γΠβ−11 + (1− γ) Πβ−12
Π1 >
[
γΠβ−11 + (1− γ) Πβ−12
] 1
β−1
.
Therefore
Π1 >
[
γΠβ−11 + (1− γ)Πβ−12
] 1
β−1
> γ
1
β−1Π1. (A.8)
Since
lim
σ→0
γ
1
β−1Π1 = Π1, (A.9)
it is also true that
lim
σ→0
κ̂ = Π1. (A.10)
Derivation of κˆ for general θ. Proposition 1 can be extended for power
functions. In order to show that FS(Y ) is greater than FL(Y ) (for κ equal to 1), it is
suﬃcient to ﬁrst observe that (A.4) can be generalized to
D (β) =
(
γβ
α
β
θ
−1 +
(1− γθ)βθ
(1− α)βθ−1
)
, (A.11)
and that the derivative of the expression equivalent to (A.6) with respect to γθ,(
γθ
α
) β
θ
−1
β
θ
ln
γθ
α
−
(
1− γθ
1− α
)β
θ
−1
β
θ
ln
1− γθ
1− α −
(
γθ
α
)β
θ
−1
−
(
1− γθ
1− α
)β
θ
−1
,
is positive.
Finally, it can be shown that κ̂ is decreasing with σ using the same argument as in
the proof of Proposition 1.
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Panel B
Figure 1: The timeline of the lumpy and stepwise investments (the top and the bottom
axis in each pair, respectively) with a commitment to undertake stage 1 immediately
(Panel A) and without any constraints on the timing of stage 1 (Panel B).
26
0.1 0.2 0.3 0.4 0.5
Σ
1.1
1.2
1.3
1.4
1.5
Κ
Γ0.8
Γ0.7
Γ0.6
Figure 2: Flexibility premium cut-oﬀ level, κ̂, as a function of payoﬀ volatility, σ, for
diﬀerent proportions of the payoﬀ generated by stage 1, γ. Other parameter values are
as follows: α = 0.5, r = 0.05, and μ = 0.015.
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Figure 3: Flexibility premium cut-oﬀ level, κ̂, as a function of payoﬀ convexity, θ,
for diﬀerent numbers of stages, n. Other parameter values are as follows: α = 0.5,
γi/γi+1 = 1.5, r = 0.05, μ = 0.015, and σ = 0.2.
28
